INTRODUCTION
EU executive rule-making, as a phenomenon distinct from law-making tout court, has been the subject of significant institutional and academic discussion in EU law. The distinction between 'measures directly based on the Treaty itself' and 'derived law intended to ensure their implementation' animated since the 1970s the debate on the legal and institutional limits of implementing acts, including on the relative competence of the Council and of the Commission in this respect. 1 Since the Lisbon Treaty, with its new scheme of delegated and implementing acts -distinct from legislative acts in the sense of Article 289(3) TFEU -much of the discussion has shifted to the distinction between these two types of acts, an issue which recent Court judgments have not clarified.
2 EU executive rule-making is far from being limited to the acts now recognized in the Treaty. In a broad sense, it includes all non-legislative acts of general application that produce external effects by concretizing the content of Treaty provisions or legislative acts and defining the criteria for the regulation of specific cases. 3 Formally, 7 The differentiation between 'the measures directly based on the This institutional perspective has relinquished other important functions that procedures could have in ensuring the legitimacy of executive rule-making. Apart from determining and organizing the relative powers and duties of the various entities involved in decision-making, procedures also rationalize public action in ways that go beyond the logic of the relative competences of the participating entities. They enable the management of information required to adopt decisions and structure the scope of available options, inter alia, by enabling the weighing of competing public interests in view of those that, by force of a Treaty or legislative provision, should be pursued in each instance. 10 In addition, they structure the relationships between decision-makers, legally affected persons and citizens. They provide access points to citizens and persons affected, be it in the form of access to information or access to decision-making. They ensure the impartiality of decision-making and the control of the choices made via reason-giving requirements. Some of these dimensions are not absent from EU executive rule-making, by force of general principles of law and Treaty rules (in the case of reason-giving). Yet, the way such general principles do apply to EU executive rule-making, if at all, is not always clear.
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As the above indicates, the relatively marginal role that rules of the administrative procedure play in the horizontal regulation of executive rule-making in the EU may be explained both by the specific features of the EU polity (in particular the lack, until recently, of an explicit constitutional differentiation between an executive and a legislative function) and by the specific way in which executive rule-making evolved therein. Nevertheless, these specificities should not overshadow the normative discussion on the possibilities to develop a procedural framework that would structure 10 See, inter alia, Curtin, Hoffman and Mendes (n 3) 3-4 and the references made therein. [65] . This judgment was issued after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, but still under the previous Treaty rules. In a sense, it makes the transition between the previous case law and the Lisbon scheme of non-legislative acts. 15 Ibid, [67, 68] .
are exempted from visa requirements and the list of third countries with which Europol may conclude international agreements should at the very least guard against too quick assumptions regarding the technical nature of this category of non-legislative acts.
(c) A Varied Spectrum of Forms and Authors
As much as institutional practice led to differentiating legal acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty and legal acts that implement them (in a broad sense), it also gave rise to a wide variety of forms of executive rule-making. In a broad sense, these include
Council regulations in the area of anti-dumping, and acts adopted by the Commission directly on the basis of the Treaty. 24 Quite different phenomena are private regulatory acts. Privately set product standards may acquire the authority of a public act in schemes such as the 'new approach to harmonisation' (e.g. via presumptions of conformity, or recognition and incorporation into legal acts of the institutions and bodies). They too convey the distinction between the realm of law-making, where essential requirements are set, and the realm of technical stipulations, defined via distinct procedures and institutional arrangements, which, in this case, arguably coalesce private autonomy and public authority. 25 They involve more than just implementation or concretization of political choices made by the Council and the Parliament, which may explain the stress put on the openness and transparency of these rule-making processes. implementing actions and the conduct of legal persons raises concerns regarding the procedural norms they would be subject to, in particular to the extent that they may largely fall outside the scope of judicial review. 31 The balance between the flexibility that, within the legal limits of its authority, the EU executive should have to perform its functions adequately, and the application of procedural rules or general principles of law that would structure their discretion is particularly delicate and difficult to strike in this case. 32 Arguably, in view of their potential effects, the making of such acts should be subject to a minimum level of formality, which some EU agencies already follow, and to guarantees that would ensure that guidance is not a means of circumventing existing procedures and the guarantees they enshrine.
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Rule-making not only may come in different forms, but also may be adopted by different authors, unilaterally or in collaborative forms, as may be the case with some informal guidance, and with private standards that enjoy a presumption of compliance.
Significantly, EU agencies also have rule-making powers. While not all agencies have the formal competence to adopt rules, quite a few regulate their respective sectors via informal regulatory instruments (such as best practices). 34 In addition, some participate in the process of making legally binding non-legislative rules. 35 The financial agencies, in particular, combine both types of power and, as many commentators have noted, stretch the rule-making powers of agencies in an unprecedented way.
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These selected examples indicate the broad range of normative acts that support the expanding administrative functions of the EU, loosely understood as those that provide criteria to apply and adjust the content of legislative acts or of Treaty provisions to concrete situations. 37 They point both to the substantive relevance of executive rulemaking in EU law and to the difficulties of placing these various acts under a single set of procedural rules that would shape them in view of the Treaty-based principles and of the legal requirements that stem from the Courts' case law. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMING OF EU RULE-MAKING (a) Constitutional Change, Normative Promise and Legal-Institutional Practice
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced, for the first time at Treaty level, the organic and procedural distinction between legislative and non-legislative rules, which previous case law and institutional practice had carved out. It also defined provisions on democratic principles. As 'founding' principles, they ought to imbue the functioning of the EU political system, including the procedures through which the EU adopts 40 The Treaty also squarely addresses the relationship between the EU institutions and citizens (Articles 9 and 11 TEU).
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of these Treaty provisions, both their systematic insertion in the Treaty and their wording acknowledge (in the case of transparency) and trigger (in the case of participation) a normative understanding of these principles as dimensions of democracy, which is qualitatively different from their understanding as good governance practices. 41 Transparency and participation ought to enable citizens and their representative associations to engage in the definition and implementation of public policies and to voice their rights and legally protected interests, in equal terms (Article 9 TEU). In this perspective, the emphasis is placed on these principles' ability to structure the relationship between public authority and those subject to it, rather than on their contribution to enhance problem-solving capacities and the effectiveness of rules -aspects which managerial theories of public administration would tend to emphasize.
Arguably, these Treaty provisions constitute normative yardsticks that ought to frame and constrain the exercise of authority in the EU and, hence, justify rethinking the existing approach to rule-making procedures in the EU as essentially a matter of the horizontal inter-institutional balances and vertical divisions of executive authority. In this view, the structural specificities that may explain the marginal role that procedural rules -in the 'thick' sense defended above 42 -have in current EU executive procedures no longer justify maintaining the status quo. Procedures should not be designed only on the basis of sector-specific needs, to address institutional conflicts or administrative collaboration, without a systematic consideration of how the authority they embody ought to be structured in view of founding legal principles. At the same time, placing the emphasis on the constitutional framework of procedures ought neither conceal the difficulties that an eventual 'proceduralization' could entail, nor obfuscate the need for flexibility in carrying out administrative functions. 43 The main challenges lie in identifying the aspects of rule-making that should be regulated horizontally, the scope of horizontal rules and their combination with sector-specific regulation and specific types of acts in a way that would not stifle the effectiveness of rule-making while still not losing sight of the way public authority should be framed within the current constitutional framework. Addressing these issues requires knowledge about the scope of current rules and institutional practices to ascertain how distanced existing rules and practices may be from the normative requirements of constitutional principles. This is a necessary step to inform the discussion on the role that a general law on the administrative procedure could have with regard to executive rule-making. To the author's knowledge, the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative acts never applied to cases on access to documents produced in the making of general non-legislative acts. 48 However 55 Ibid, [96] . 56 The 2015 guidelines on impact assessment distinguish between 'consultations', which are subject to the minimum standards of consultation, from 'feedback' processes, which are not subject to those standards (Commission Staff Working Document, Better Regulation Guidelines COM (2015) 215 final, p. 66, footnote 86).
documents and would balance them against the principle of democracy as enshrined in the Treaty.
Participation in rule-making: no-law's land
Participation in EU rule-making has been and largely remains a principle of governance valued in its ability to enhance problem-solving capacities, process efficiency and policy outcomes. 57 Rather than a principle of democracy, which postulates that citizens or their representatives are given voice and equal treatment, in a way that could arguably place external constraints on the way public authority is exercised, participation is seen as a means of asking 'the right people … the right questions about the right initiatives, so as to feed into Commission decision-making in an efficient manner'. 58 There seems to be little, if any, institutional awareness of the normative implications entailed in the way in which the Treaty frames participation. While the intention to extend the scope of consultations appears to be in tune with the wording of Article 11(3) TEU, nothing in the Commission's guidelines indicates that such processes could have a democratic meaning. They have a different rationale. Consultations occur in the context of impact assessments, which are a tool to 68 Better Regulation Guidelines (n 56), 17 (emphasis added). 69 Ibid. In addition, the same guidelines indicate that 'stakeholder consultations can in principle take place throughout the whole policy cycle. However, stakeholder consultations can only be launched for initiatives which have received political validation by the appropriate political level (cf. Chapter II on Planning)'. 70 On the advantages of the current practices, see P Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012); Harlow and Rawlings (n 43). The Court advanced an argument of equivalence in Case T-296/12 The Health Food Manufacturers' Association (n 65) at [181] .
way the Commission describes the advantages of stakeholders' consultations reveals the underlying 'problem-solving approach' to participation: consultations involve those 'who will be directly impacted by the policy' and 'those who are involved in ensuring its correct application'; it can improve the 'evidence-base' of policy-making; it can 'avoid problems later and promote greater acceptance of the policy initiative/intervention'. 72 , 73 This approach arguably stands in contrast with the democratic perspective on participation that the systematic insertion of Article 11 in the Treaty conveys. 74 The purpose is not to ensure equal voice (in terms of access and treatment) to those interested in having a say in public action.
The rationale of impact assessment indicates that the basic reference for voice is the expert, not the person. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the guidelines reveal a concern for inclusiveness of those consulted. . 75 Better Regulation Guidelines 2015 (n 56) 73-76. 76 Ibid, 76, emphasis added. 77 Ibid, 76, emphasis added.
again indicates an approach to participation as an instrument to support the governance process, rather than as a means to ensure that the decision-makers have a suitable representation of the legally protected interests that their decisions may affect and weigh such interests in line with the public interests that the legislator defined in the parent act. This perspective would require giving voice irrespective of regulatory preferences -an aspect that the better regulation approach to participation may not ensure.
In addition, the long list of exceptions to 'public consultations' on delegated and implementing acts confirms the broad discretion that the Commission retains in defining the opportunities of participation. ability of the statement of reasons to enable interested parties to understand the justification of the act at stake. 88 The statement of reasons of implementing acts -in the broad sense the term had before the Treaty of Lisbon -is assessed on the basis of an additional criterion: the relationship between the basic and the implementing act may justify a succinct statement of the latter. The reference to the basic act may be sufficient to clarify the reasons for the adoption of the implementing act, if the the basic act provides criteria on the content of the implementing act. 89 The Court then assesses the adequacy of the statement of reasons given by reference to the provisions of the main act. 90 The same line of reasoning may apply to acts that are not in a subordinate relationship, but that have been adopted in a given legislative context, which, on the whole, may be sufficient to clarify succinct reasons given by the author of the act. 91 In addition, when the act at issue is consistent with previous measures a succinct statement of reasons accompanied by reference to other acts may suffice, unless that act 'goes appreciably further' than those measures. 92 The Court's careful approach in using its power of review of the duty to give reasons indicates that it intends to maintain, as far as possible, the fragile distinction between reviewing process requirements and the substantive legality of a measure. 93 The Court is in principle unwilling to perform a hard look review on the basis of reason-
giving. An 'ossification' of rule-making, which has concerned American scholarship, as a result of judicial review is arguably unlikely in the EU. 94 For the same reason, it is unlikely that a possible restatement of this case law in a general law of the administrative procedure would diminish the flexibility that the Court now recognizes to the institutions when providing reasons for acts of general scope.
The duty of care
The inclusion of the duty of care (i.e. careful and impartial examination) in this chapter could seem prima facie misplaced. The duty of care refers to the process of collecting the information needed to appraise the relevant factual and legal aspects of a given situation, and the manner in which such information is assessed. 95 It has a protective dimension, since it allows the EU Courts, in particular the General Court, to challenge the legality of administrative acts adopted on the basis of insufficient or inadequate information. 96 Yet, this same protective dimension has led the Courts to acknowledge the limits of extending this duty beyond the limits of adjudicatory procedures. The question then is whether and how this duty applies to executive rule-making. 98 It is 'imposed in the public interest'. 99 In a similar vein, the General Court has denied that the duty of care could be a procedural guarantee invoked by complainants in state aid procedures -which, arguably, lead to acts of general scope. 100 In the case of T-Mobile, the Court of Justice reverted the judgment of the General Court by contesting its argument that the Commission's obligation to undertake a diligent and impartial examination of a complaint would arise from the 'right to sound administration of individual situations'. 101 The objective dimension of this duty has been translated, in the area of risk regulation, into the principles of excellence, transparency and independence that ought to guide scientific assessments of the Commission, the breach of which may be invoked Notwithstanding the specificities of the EU legal order, EU law has developed a set of constitutional and legal principles that arguably ought to frame the way in which executive rules are made. Procedures should heed the external effects that executive rules produce, and be conceived in a way that structures public authority accordingly, in addition to reflecting the evolving inter-institutional relations or defining a division of tasks or collaboration between the EU institutions and Member States.
The general legal principles that apply to the procedures by which the EU adopts executive rules have been largely developed via case law. The EU Courts have defined their scope and the way in which they structure these procedures, also where general rules apply by force of legislative acts (namely, on access to documents). They have solidified existing institutional practices without examining them through the lens of a democratic rationale of transparency and participation that the Lisbon Treaty now enshrines. In the case of transparency, the argument that access to documents is a means of enabling citizens (and legal persons) to participate in the making of decisions that affect them has prevailed in access to legislative documents (i.e. pertaining to legislative procedures) to the detriment of access to administrative documents insofar as general presumptions of non-disclosure apply. The application of a general presumption of non-disclosure in the wide way in which it was admitted in ClientEarth virtually closes the procedure to access by interested persons or the public, except in the stages that the Commission itself considers it useful to have outside input and to the extent that it wishes to have such input.
While it remains to be seen whether ClientEarth will become settled case law, the Courts' position regarding participation in rule-making was defined in the 1990s
and has stayed unchanged, notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty provisions on democracy. As noted, given standing rules and litigants' incentives to challenge executive rules, judicial action is not the most suitable avenue to concretize participation as a democratic principle in view of Article 11 TEU. At the same time, current institutional practices of participation, namely via impact assessments, can hardly be considered a functional equivalent to democratic participation, despite indications to the contrary in the case law.
It follows from the above that the EU Courts' case law, rather than shaping institutional practices in view of constitutional principles, is arguably entrenching institutional practices, maintaining the gap between principles and practices. This observation applies to participation and, in part at least, to access to documents. The case is different with regard to the duty to give reasons and to the duty of careful and impartial examination. The way the Court has shaped the duty to give reasons enables a control function that is important for the concretization of the Treaty principles (even if this duty serves also other rationales), while ensuring enough flexibility that avoids excessive procedural constraints. The duty of care may serve such a function, but the way it applies to rule-making still needs to be concretized.
pass a procedural law applicable to rule-making. 107 The positions of the Commission and of the Council may partially explain the silence of the Parliament in this regard. 108 In addition to legal issues and institutional resistances, the variety of forms in which executive rules may be adopted in the EU is a challenge to the definition of general rules of procedure that would concretize constitutional principles in a horizontal way.
Suggesting concrete rules means struggling with complex trade-offs and entails costs and imbalances that need to be carefully considered. However, these should be seen as a part of a discussion on procedural design that should be constitutionally informed, rather than as insurmountable obstacles to the definition of procedural rules. 
